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Howard: Nuclear Plant Construction

NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION AFTER
PACIFIC GAS: A PYRRIC VICTORY FOR
THE STATES?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the world's first atomic explosion in Almogardo, New
Mexico in 1945, Congress has attempted to maintain a regulatory system aimed at protecting the population from the hazards
of the use of nuclear energy. In passing the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946,1 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,2 Congress erected
a complex regulatory scheme that initially safeguarded military
interests 8 and subsequently, in the early 1950's, promoted the
development of a nuclear industry in the private sector. Despite
development of nuclear energy as a source of commercial power,
however, Congress continued to safeguard the public from the
dangers of an uncertain technology and required that fissionable
materials· and nuclear technology continue to be regulated by
1. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755.

2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§
2011-2096.
3. The Congressional declaration of policy stated:
Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as
well as military purposes. It is therefore declared to be the
policy of the United States that (a) the development, use and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to
the paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense and security; and . . .
(b) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in private
enterprise.
H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954) reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 1076, 1079
4. Fission is a process by which a heavy element, such as uranium or plutonium, is
used to absorb a neutron, and subsequently splits into two lighter elements, releasing
more neutrons. A chain reaction develops as one of the released neutrons initiates
another fission. The releasing of the neutrons produces a large amount of energy; the
speed of the reaction can be controlled to produce a constant stream of energy. See
generally NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES AND CHOICES;
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the federal government. 5 Along with this development of nuclear
energy as a source of commercial electrical power, the amount of
spent nuclears fuel began to increase. 7 Unfortunately, the nuclear industry's vision of the development of a spent fuel
reprocessing industry failed to materialize for a variety of reasons and the federal government failed to develop a safe longterm method to dispose of spent fuel. s As a result, the nuclear
J. HEGERTON, ATOMIC FUEL (1964); R. LYERLY & W. MITCHELL, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
(1973).
5. The 1954 Senate bill noted that in 1946 there was little experience concerning the
health hazards of atomic energy. This in itself was reason to keep atomic power a govern·
ment monopoly. See S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954); reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3456, 3458-59.
By 1954, the United States had had nuclear capabilities for almost a decade. The
primary purpose of the Senate was to bring the previous Act of 1946 into accord with the
scientific, technical, economic and political changes that had occurred since 1946. See S.
REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess; (1954); reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Congo & Ad.
News 3456, 3457. Additionally, Congress felt that these health problems had been diminished enough to allow greater private participation in atomic power. The Congress
looked to the first experimental plant in Idaho, and the success of the U.S.S. Nautilus
atomic submarine, among others. While it was recognized that many technological
problems remained, Congress was convinced that use of atomic energy.to produce electricity would be achieved more quickly if private enterprise were encouraged to participate. [d. at 3458.
6. The term "spent nuclear fuel" refers to highly radioactive fuel, which must be
removed from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the constituent elements of which
have not been separated by reprocessing. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 10101 (23) (1983);
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, MANAGING COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL WASTE (April,
1982).
7. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that "some 8000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel
have already accumulated, and it is projected by the year 2000 there will be some 72,000
metric tons of spent fuel." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Commission,
__ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1717 (1983). See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MANAGING COMMERCIAL HIGH LEVEL WASTE, 9 (April 1982); 128 CONGo REC. H8166
(Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Winn) (twenty-eight plants may be forced to close for a
lack of storage); id. at H8533 (Nov. 29, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Broyhill) (only 1900 metric tons of spent fuel can be stored in "last resort" fuel storage areas provided by federal
government; this is less than three percent of the total spent fuel projected to be generated by commercial power plants by the year 2000).
8. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, P.L. 97-425, H. REp. 97-491, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 26-29 ("confidence that the technical issues affecting nuclear waste disposal
were easily resoluable for decades rendered Federal officials responsible for providing the
facilities apathetic towards addressing those technical issues, and unprepared for the immense social and political problems which would obstruct implementation of a serious
repository development program. ")
The NRC has determined that the earliest date for one or more geological repositories is 2007-2009. See 48 Fed. Reg. 22730 (May, 1983). Long term disposal at the present
time, "refers to the storage of highly radioactive waste products that pose the most severe potential health hazard" until they detoxify sufficiently that they do not present an
environmental or health hazard. There are currently no known methods of detoxification, other than the passage of hundreds of thousands of years. See generally U.S.
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industry, and both state and federal government, face the possibility of an occurrence of both a health and an economic
nightmare brought on by the eventual necessity of disposal of
the fuel.
In partial response to this multifaceted problem, the California legislature, in 1976, amended a portion of the Public Resources Code (known as the Warren-Alquist Act) by conditioning the construction of-nuclear power plants on findings by the
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission ("the Energy Commission") that adequate storage facilities and means of disposal are available for nuclear waste. Specifically, section 25524.1(b)9 addresses the interim storage
problem by providing that before a nuclear plant may be constructed, the Energy Commission must determine on a case-bycase basis that there will be adequate capacity for the storage of
a plant's full core "at the time such nuclear facility requires such
... storage." Under section 25524.l(b), the utility must provide
full core reserve storage capacity in order that the entire reactor
core may be stored in the event it must be removed. Section
25524.2 10 addresses the long term storage problem of nuclear
12 (1965).
9. Section 25524.1(b) states:
The commission shall further find on a case-by-case basis that
facilities with adequate capacity to reprocess nuclear fuel rods
from a certified nuclear facility or to store such fuel if such
storage is approved by an authorized agency of the United
States are in actual operation or will be in operation at the
time such nuclear facility requires such reprocessing or storage; provided, however, that such storage of fuel is in an offsite location to the extent necessary to provide continuous onsite full core reserve storage capacity.
10. Section 25524.2 provides in relevant part:
No nuclear fission thermal powerplant, including any to which
the provisions of this chapter do not otherwise apply, but excepting those exempted herein, shall be permitted land use in
the state, or where applicable, be certified by the commission
until both conditions (a) and (b) have been met:
(a) The commission finds that there has been developed
and that the United States through its authorized agency has
approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or
means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste.
(b) The commission has reported its findings and reasons
therefor pursuant to paragraph (a) to the Legislature . . . .
(c) As used in this section, "technology or means for the
disposal of high-level nuclear waste" means a method for the
permanent and terminal disposition of high level nuclear

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, RADIOACTIVE WASTES
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waste. Under this section, the Energy Commission will not issue
a land use certificate to any utility seeking to construct a plant
until the Energy Commission "finds that there has been developed and that the United States through its authorized agency
has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or
means for the [permanent] disposal of high-level waste."ll In
Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation
and Development Commission.12 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether California Public Resources Code sections 25524.1(b) and 25524.2 were preempted by
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In a unanimous opinion, the Pacific Gas Court upheld the validity of section 25524.2 on the
grounds that it was within the traditional role of a state's authority to regulate electricity production by determining the future economic viability of a nuclear power plant. I3 Despite the
holding as to section 25524.2, the court held that the challenge
to section 25524.l(b) was not ripe for judicial review since the
Energy Commission had not found any nuclear plant's storage
facilities to be inadequate. I4
waste. It shall not necessarily require that facilities for the application of such technology and/or means be available at the
time the commission makes its findings. Such disposition shall
not necessarily preclude the possibility of an approved process
for retrieval of such waste.
(d) The commission shall continue to receive and process
notices of intention and applications for certification pursuant
to this division but shall not issue a decision pursuant to Section 25523 granting a certificate until the requirements of this
section have been met. All other permits, licenses, approvals
or authorizations for the entry or use of the land, including
orders of court, which may be required may be processed and
granted by the governmental entity concerned but construction work to install permanent equipment or structures shall
not commence until the requirements of this section have
been met.
(e) Any nuclear fission power plant is exempted from the
provisions of this section if prior to the date on which this
section is chaptered an electric utility has performed substantial construction on such powerplant and has incurred substantial expense for construction and for necessary materials
for such powerplant, including, but not limited to, the following sites and facilities . . . .
11. Under Section 25524.2(c), "Disposal" is defined as a "method for the permanent
and terminal distribution of high-level nuclear waste ...."
12. __ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 1713 [hereinafter cited as Pacific Gas).
13. Pacific Gas at __, 103 S.Ct. at 1731-32.
14. [d. at __, 103 S.Ct. at 1720.
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The topic of preemption, and the application of this doctrine to this case, has been oft discussed among legal commentators prior to the final ruling on the case by the Supreme Court. 1&
This Note will not discuss the history of the preemption doctrine, but instead will analyze the Pacific Gas decision and then
consider the option left to a state once the state has concluded
that it is not satisfied with the federal resolution of the waste
crisis facing the country in the 1990'S.18
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Warren-Alquist Act

The Warren-Alquist Actl'7 was enacted by California in
1974. This act was adopted in furtherance of the legislature's
perception of the state's responsibility to ensure a reliable
source of electrical energy, and to require coordination of energy
research and regulation at the state level. 18
The legislature created a five-member State Energy Resources and Conservation and Development commission in 1974
(the Energy Commission) to coordinate regulation and research
to accomplish the objective. 19 The Energy Commission has
broad authority, and holds hearings and investigations necessary
to carry out its duties. 20 The duties of the Energy Commission
include energy planning and forecasting (such as assessment of
alternative energy sources), conservation, and research and development. 21
15. See e.g., Tribe, California Declines The Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679 (1979); Murphy and La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium"
Legislation In the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 392 (1976); Note, California'8 Nuclear Power Regulations: Federal Preemption?, 9 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 623 (1982); Note, Applications of the Preemption
Doctrine to State Laws Affecting Nuclear Power Plants, 62 VA. L. REv. 738 (1976);
Comment, Federal Preemption of State Laws Controlling Nuclear Power, 64 GEO. L.J.
1323 (1976).
16. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.

17. The Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
18. Id. at § 2SOO1-25P07.
19. Id. at § 25200.
20. Id. at § 25210.
21. California's system of regulatory power plants is similar to that employed by
other states. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Commission, 659
F.2d 903, 907, n.2 (9th Cu. 1981).
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Section 25500 of the California Public Resources Code gives
the Energy Commission the authority to certify all construction
or modification of nuclear or non-nuclear power plants. To obtain certification, the utilities must follow a two-step procedure.
First, any utility planning to construct a power plant must at an
early stage submit a "notice of intention" (NOI).22 Each NOI
must contain at least three alternative sites for the prospective
plant, only two of which may be near the coast. 23 After hearings
and investigations by the Energy Commission and an analysis of
the data, the Energy Commission will approve the NOI only if at
least two of the proposed sites are acceptable, or one site is acceptable and a good faith effort to find an alternative has been
made.24
If the NOI is approved, the applicant must then file an "ap-

plication for certification" (AFC), after which the Energy Commission conducts a further review process not to exceed eighteen
months. 26 The AFC must contain a description of the proposed
plant's design, safety and reliability, projections of the fuel costs
and generating costs, and any other information that the Energy
Commission may require. 2s The Energy Commission will then
release findings which must address the applicant's compliance
with land use, health, environmental and other standards established by the Energy Commission. 27 As a condition of certifica22. Section 25502 provides: "[T]he notice shall be an attempt primarily to determine the suitability of the proposed sites to accommodate the facilities and to determine
the general conformity of the proposed sites and related facilities with standard of the
commission . . . . " Section 25504 requires that the NO! include the location of the proposed plant, a summary of the design, the type of fuels to be used and, among other
things, a preliminary statement of the relative economic, technological and environmental advantages and disadvantages of the proposed and alternative sites. CAL. PUB. REs.
CODE § 22503 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
23. As noted by the Ninth Circuit, this section implements the concept of "site
banking." If more than one of the proposed sites is found to be acceptable, the unused
sites are to be "banked" by the Energy Commission and made available to future applicants seeking certification. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Commission, 659 F.2d 903, 907 (9th Cir., 1981).
24. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 22516. Additionally, the Energy Commission, in making
its findings, shall seek out comments and recommendations from the Public Utilities
Commission, and the California Coastal Conservation Commission. The Energy Commission should take into account proposed emergency systems, the threat of seismic h828lds,
• and any applicable land
ability of controlling population densities in surrounding areas,
use laws. See generally CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 25505-25514.
25. Id. § 25517.
26. Id § 25520.
27. Id. §§ 25216.3, 25402(d), 25523.
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tion, the Energy Commission may require the utility to obtain
development rights to property surrounding the plant so as to
maintain population densities at a safe leveps The Energy Commission is also directed to monitor certified plants once they become operational under Public Resources Code Section 25532.

B. Amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act: The Nuclear
Laws of 1976
In 1976, the California legislature added several provisions
to the Warren-Alquist Act (known collectively as "The Nuclear
Laws") that are applicable only to nuclear plants. 2s These provisions imposed a moratorium on the certification of any new nuclear plants until the Energy Commission makes certain findings
and submits them to the California legislature for approval. Section 25524.1(a) prohibits the certification of nuclear plants requiring fuel reprocessing until the Energy Commission finds that
a federally approved method of fuel reprocessing exists; section
25524.1(b) requires a case by case analysis of whether facilities
to store spent fuel rods are available. Section 25524.2 prohibits
the certification of all types of nuclear plants until the Energy
Commission finds that a federally approved method of disposing
of nuclear wastes exists; section 25524.3 prohibits the certification of all types of nuclear plants until the Energy Commission
has completed and submitted to the legislature a study on the
feasibility. of undergrounding and berm containment. 30
These amendments require the Energy Commission to determine on a case by case basis whether facilities are available to
store spent fuel rods,31 but direct the Energy Commission to
continue to process NOl's and AFC's even though, until the
findings required by section 25524.2 are made, the applications
cannot be certified. 32
28. [d. § 25528.
29. [d. §§ 25524.1, 25524.2, 25524.3.
30. Berm containment is a method of "placing [a nuclear] reactor in a scooped out
hole and backfilling with dirt . . . to increase the margin of safety in the event of an
accident which breached the containment building." See Pacific Legal Foundation v.
State Energy Resources Commission, 659 F.2d at 909, n.8 (9th Cir., 1981).
31. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524(b).
32. [d. §§ 25524.l{c), 25524.1(d), 25524.3(c). See also §§ 25500,25517 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1984) cited in Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Commission,
659 F.2d at 909 [hereinafter cited as PLF].
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The Lower Court Decisions

The petitioners in PG & E v. Energy Res. Comm'n, Pacific
Ga~ and Electric Company and Southern California Edison
Company (SCE), both claimed that uncertainities caused by the
amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act had caused them to cancel plans to build nuclear plants. PG & E cancelled a specific
project known as "Stanislaus." SCE spent no money but abandoned general plans to build plants only known then as "Nuclear I" and "Nuclear 2."33 The utilities brought suit claiming
that sections 25524.1, 25524.2 and 25524.3 were preempted by
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 3• The federal court for the Eastern District of California agreed with the utilities and held that
insofar as the challenged provisions regulate nuclear plants, they
were preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.311 The Ninth
33. Pac. Gas & Elec. v. SERC, 489 F. Supp. 699,701-702 (1980).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1970); See also Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources & Development Commission, 472 F. Supp. 191, 192 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
35. This case originally involved consolidated appeals from two district court cases,
Pac. Gas & Elec. v. SERC, 489 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Cal. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
PG&E] and Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 472 F.Sup. 191 (S.D. Cal., 1979). In the latter case, the petitioners
challenged the validity of § 25524.2 only. In addressing this challenge, the trial court,
relied on the analysis used in Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.20 (1978) and found that only one plaintiff, Richard Thornberry,
had standing to sue. Thornberry was a nuclear engineer hired by San Diego Gas and
Electric Co. ("SDG & E") to work on a proposed nuclear plant known as Sundesert,
which was abandoned by SDG & E's board of directors.
The trial court's reason for finding standing was that in Duke Power, the United
States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is allowed standing by establishing that even
though the casual connection for injury is indirect, the connection is sufficient to provide
standing. According to the trial court, only Thornberry presented concrete injury traceable to the Nuclear Laws, as Thornberry alleged that he lost his job because the Nuclear
Law moratorium on certification forced SDG & E to cancel the Sundesert project. The
trial court found there was a "substantial likelihood" that the project would have proceeded absent the Nuclear Laws, and thus Thornberry'S position would not have been
terminated. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources & Development
Comm'n, 472 F.Supp. 191, 195.
By granting the engineer's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found
Thornberry's challenge to §§ 25524.1 and 25524.3 to be moot, but declared § 25524.2 to
be preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Id. at 197. The Court of Appeal reversed. The standing doctrine established by the United States Supreme Court also requires a "substantial likelihood" that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed.
See PLF, 659 F.2d at 914, citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595, 612 (1978). The Energy
Commission's contentions that Thornberry had not demonstrated that the Sundesert
project would be restarted or, if that occurred, whether he would be rehired by SDG & E
caused the Ninth Circuit to determine that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),
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Circuit reversed, finding that only two of the challenged provisions, sections 25503 and 25524.2 were ripe for review. Section
25524.l(b) was held not to present a justiciable controversy because the Energy Commission has never taken direct action to
require that any plant provided a specified amount of storage
space. 86 In addressing the merits, the Ninth Circuit first held
that the nuclear moratorium provisions of section 25524.2 were
not preempted because sections 271 87 and 274(k)86 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 constitute a Congressional authorization for
states to regulate nuclear power plants "for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards. "89 Second, the Ninth Circuit held that section 25524.2 was not designed to provide protection against radiation hazards, but becaUse "uncertainities in
the nuclear fuel cycle make nuclear power an uneconomical and
uncertain source of energy."40 Third, the court held that section
25524.2 was not invalid as a barrier to fulfillment of the federal
goal of encouraging the development of atomic energy in the private sector.41 Instead, the court noted that Congress did not intend that nuclear power be developed "at all costs," but only
that it proceed consistently with other priorities, subject to controls traditionally exercised by the states and expressly preserved by federal statute.42
The Supreme Court granted certiorari48 on the issues of
whether the petitioner's challenges to section 25524.1(b) and
summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. at 913. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 102 S.Ct. 2959.
36. PLF 659 F.2d at 913.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency
with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric
power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed
by the Commission: Provided, That this section shall not be
deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local agency any
authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the
Commission.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) states: U(k) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other
than protection against radiation hazards."
39. PLF, 659 F.2d at 921.
40. [d. at 925.
41. [d. at 926.
42. [d. at 928.
43. 102 S.Ct. 2956.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6

368 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:359

section 25524.2 were ripe for judicial review and whether sections 25524.1(b) and 25524.2 were preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In its decision the Supreme Court affirmed,
agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that section 25524.2 was ripe for
judicial review, but that the questions concerning section
25524.1 (b) were not. 44
II.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION

A.

The Majority
1.

Ripeness

Justice White, delivering the unanimous OpInIOn of the
Court, began by affirming the procedural holding of the Ninth
Circuit that the utilities' challenge to section 25524.2 was ripe
for judicial review, but that the questions concerning section
25524.1(b) was not. The Court observed that the basic rationale
of the ripeness doctrine "is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
, abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. "411
2.

Preemption: State Authority and Purpose

Before addressing the substantive issues of the utilities'
challenge, the Court reiterated three circumstances defining
when Congress may constitutionally preempt state authority.
First, it is well established that Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in express terms!8 Second, the Court noted,
in the absence of explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent
to supersede state law altogether may be surmised from a
"scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it.""
44. Pacific Gas _
U.S. _ , 103 S.Ct 1713, 1720-22.
45. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1966).
46. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, (1977).
47. Pacific Gas, _
U.S. _ , _,103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722; Fidelity Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta _
U.S. _ , _ , 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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The third scenario occurs when Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation, yet compliance with state law would
conflict with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"48 or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress. "49
In addressing the substantive merits, the Court noted the
absence of any express language in the Atomic Energy Act of a
requirement that the states must construct or authorize nuclear
power plants, or alternatively, prohibit the states from deciding
as an absolute or conditional matter not to permit the construction of any further reactors"~o The Court rejected the petitioners'
argument that the Atomic Energy Act was intended to preserve
the federal government as the sole regulator of all matters dealing with nuclear or fissionable material, thereby causing section
25524.2 to fall within the scope of an impliedly preempted field.
Instead, the Court began its analysis with the assumption that
the historical powers of the states were not to be superseded by
the Atomic Energy Act absent a clear and express intent of Congress. lIl Accordingly, the Court found the passing of the 1954 Act
and the subsequent amendments to be an indication that Congress intended that the federal government continue to regulate
the radiological aspects involved in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, but that the states keep the traditional responsibility of determining the need for new power facilities, their economic feasibility and rates and services. 1I2 As
authority for this assumption, the Court looked to Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,1I3 where the Court
stated: "There is little doubt that under. the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar bodies are
empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for
power."114 Moreover, the court found the Atomic Energy Act of
48. Pacific Gas _
U.S. _ , _,103 S.Ct. 1713,1722; Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132. 142-153 (1963).
49. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1722; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941).
50. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1722.
51. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
52. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1722-23.
53. 435 U.S. 519 (1977).
54. Id. at 550.
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19461111 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954116 gave exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government only to license the transfer,
delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession and use of nuclear
materials. The Court noted that the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) was not given authority over either the generation of
electricity itself or the decision concerning the economic viability of the construction of a future nuclear plant. 1I7 The Court
also noted that the successor to the AEC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), has stated that utility financial qualifications are only of concern to the NRC if related to the public
health and safety. liS The Court concluded its discussion on the
right of states to determine the economic viability of the construction of a new nuclear plant by examining the language of
the Atomic Energy Act itself and its subsequent amendments.
Specifically, section 271 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or
transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission."119 The Court, in examining the 1959 Amendments, also found that the goal of the
Amendments was to increase the states' role. 60 The Court observed that while the authority of the federal government to
continue to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear
plants was reserved by the 1959 Amendments by section
274(c),61 Congress clearly confirmed by legislating in section
274(k)62 that state power over the production of electricity was
not to be otherwise eliminated. Section 274(k) states: "Nothing
55.
56.
(1976).
57.
58.

See A(.-t of Aug. I, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755.
Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281

Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1723-1724.
[d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1724.
59. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1724. Congress also noted in the Senate and House
Reports of the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy that section 271 preserved the power
of local regulatory agencies with regard to the sale, generation or distribution of electric
power. S.REP.No. 1699, 83d Congo 2d Sess. 31 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Congo 2d
Sess. 31 (1954).
60. Pacific Gas at _,103 S.Ct. at 1724. The Court noted that § 274(b), [42 U.S.C.
2021(b» authorized the NRC by agreements with state governors to discontinue its regulatory authority over certain nuclear and lower level nuclear material "in quantities not
sufficient to form a critical mass." [d. at _ , n.20, 103 S.Ct. at 1725, n.20.
61. § 274(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) provides in part: "The Commission shall retain
authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of: (1) the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility; . . . ." [d.
62. 42. U.S.C. § 2021(k).
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in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any
state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other
than protection against radiation hazards. "63
The Court concluded "that from the passage of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, through several revisions, and to the present
day, Congress has preserved the dual regulation of nuclear-powered electricity generation: the federal government maintains
complete control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of energy
generation; the states exercise their traditional authority over
the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use, rate making and the
like. "6.
In the next major portion of the preemption discussion, the
Court emphasized that it did not interpret section 25524.2 as
seeking to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear
power plant, but instead was aimed at economic hazards. 6~ Accordingly, the Court held that the statute lies outside the federally occupied field of nuclear safety regulations. 66 The Court
held it would be clearly impermissible for California to attempt
to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear power
plant, even if done out of non-safety concerns, due to the NRC's
63. Pacific Gas __ U.S. at __, 103 S.Ct. at 1725. The Court observed that:
"§ 274(k) by itself limits only the preemptive effect of § 274, and does represent an

affirmative grant of power to the states. But Congress by permitting regulating 'for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards' underscored the distinction drawn
in 1954 between the spheres of activity left respectively to the federal government and
the states." Id.
Moreover, the opinion holds that this regulatory structure has remained unchanged
for purposes of this case until 1965, when the following proviso was added to section 271:
"Provided, that this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State or
Local agency any authority to regulate, control or restrict any activities of the
Commission. "
The opinion noted that the provision was added to overrule a Court of Appeals
opinion, Maun v. United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1956). In Maun, the court interpreted § 271 to allow a municipality to prohibit transmission lines necessary for the
AEC's own activities. The Supreme Court referred to the reports and documents of the
1965 Amendment to conclude that the purpose of the 1965 provision "was to make it
absolutely clear that the Atomic Energy Act's special provisions on licensing of reactors
did not disturb the status quo with respect to the then existing authority of Federal,
State, and local bodies to regulate generation, sale, or transmission of electric power."
See Pacific Gas at __ U.S. __,103 S.Ct. at 1726.
64. Pacific Gas at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1726.
65. Id. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1727.
66. Id. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1728.
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exclusive authority over the entire field of nuclear safety concerns except the limited powers expressly delegated to the
stateS. 67 In dismissing any questions as to whether a state may
completely prohibit construction of a nuclear plant until that
state's safety concerns are satisfied by the federal government,
the Court referred to the well established preemption test68
which is applied when the federal government completely occ~
pies a given field or an identifiable portion thereof: "[T]he test
of preemptions is whether 'the matter on which the state asserts
the right to act is in any way regulated by the federal government.' "69 In applying the test, the Court held that a conflict
would arise with a judgment that nuclear power is not safe
enough to be further developed, and that in effect, any state
prohibition on nuclear construction for safety reasons would
conflict with the Atomic Energy Act's objective to insure that
nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread development
and use. 70 In deciding whether there was a non-safety rationale
for section 25524.2, the Court first looked to the report by the
California Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and
Energy ("the Committee").71 In that report,72 the Committee essentially viewed the problem as one where non-disposable wastes
accumulate with no permanent disposal sites available, thereby
creating a "clog" in the nuclear fuel cycle. 78 The Committee determined that, without a permanent means of disposal, the nuclear waste problem made nuclear power an economically uncertain and unpredictable source of power which could lead to the
creation of high costs to contain the problem or closure of already existing plants. 74 The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the Committee Report to find that the statute
67. ld. See also note 147 infra and accompanying text. Congress has authorized the
states to regulate radioactive air pollutants from nuclear power plants under the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 122,42 U.S.C. § 742, and to impose certain citing and
land use requirements for nuclear plants. See NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
190, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 780 (1980).
68. See e.g. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, _
U.S._,
_ , 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236, 67
S.Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947).
69. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1726.
70. ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1727.
71. ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1727.
72. REASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA: A POLICY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 15 AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (1976) (Reassessment Report).
73.ld.
74. ld. at 156.
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was directed towards purposes other than protection against radiation hazards and stated that "California is concerned not
with the adequacy of the method, but rather with its existence."711
The opinion reiterated that the Court places "considerable
confidence in the interpretations of state law reached by the federal courts of appeals."?6 In support of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of California's intent, the Court found sufficiently
specific the language of the statute which states that the "development" and "existence" of a permanent disposal technology
approved by federal authorities will lift the moratorium. The
Court held the language of the statute evinced sufficient concern
with the economics of nuclear power by observing that "[o]nce a
technology is selected and demonstrated, the utilities and the
California Public Utilities Commission would be able to estimate
costs; such cost estimates cannot be made until the federal government has settled upon the method of long-term waste disposal."?? The Court held meritless the suggestion by the petitioners that California, if concerned with economics, would have
banned California utilities from building plants outside the
state.?8 The Court noted there was no indication that California
utilities were contemplating such construction and accordingly
that the California legislature was not "obligated to address
purely hypothetical facets of a problem. "?9 The Court also held
that the statute was not invalidated simply because the California Public Utilities Commission was authorized, on a case by
case basis, to determine on economic grounds whether a nuclear
power plant should be constructed. The Court observed that
California was not foreclosed from reaching the same decision
through a legislative judgment because the economic uncertainties involved with nuclear waste disposal do not differ from facility to facility. The Court concluded that "the issue readily lends
itself to more generalized decision making and California cannot
be faulted for pursuing that course."80 The Court rejected the
suggestion the statute be invalidated on the ground that section
75.
76.
77.
78.

PLF, 659 F.2d at 925.
Pacific Gas at _ , 103
ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at
ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at
79. ld. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at
80. ld. at _,103 S.Ct. at
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25524.2 arose after the defeat of Proposition 15,81 a voter initiative that, along with the Nuclear Laws, was clearly written with
safety purposes in mind. The Court observed that Proposition
15 was not passed by the voters of California and was not before
the Court. In concluding, the Court stated "these provisions and
their pedigree do not twist other parts of the Warren-Alquist
Act. 1182
'The Court provided two additional reasons for declining to
overturn the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of California's intent
in enacting Section 25524.2. First, "the Court declined to inquire
into the motive of the legislature."8s The Court noted that it
would be difficult to determine the motivation of each and every
legislator. Second, the opinion concluded that it would be inappropriate for the court to engage in speculation as to the motivation of the legislature in light of the well established state authority to not only determine the need for electrical generating
facilities, but also to halt the construction of new nuclear plants
by refusing on economic grounds to issue certification of public
convenience. M
3. Preemption: Conflict Between Regulations
The Court found that section 25524.2 does not conflict with
federal regulations of nuclear waste disposal, notwithstanding
the decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, v. NRC8r.
81. The subject nuclear provisions were passed by the California legislature before
the people voted on Proposition 15 (California Nuclear Initiative). Proposition 15 would
have banned nuclear plants absent a determination by the California legislature that
nuclear wastes could be "stored and disposed of with no reasonable chance of intentional
or unintentional escape of nuclear wastes or radioactivity into the environment which
would adversely affect the land or the people of California. See generally PLF 659 F.2d
at 925. Had Proposition 15 passed, the Nuclear Laws would not have become operative.
See 1976 Cal.Stats, chs. 194, § 2; 195, § 2; 196 § 2. See generally Tribe, California Declines The Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a Choice Preempted?, ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 680 n.5
(1979).
82. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1728.
83.ld.
84. Id.
85. 582 F.2d 166, 168-169 (2nd Cir. 1978). The NRC refused to halt nuclear reactor
licensing until it had developed a method of permanent waste disposal. Pursuant to the
language of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075, 2111-2114, both the
AEC and its successor, the NRC, have promulgated extensive regulations concerning
both the handling of nuclear materials and the operation of civilian and military nuclear
facilities. Under 10 CFR 50.34(b)(20)(i)-(ii), an applicant seeking to receive a NRC oper-
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that it was appropriate for the NRC to conclude that it could
continue to license new reactors given the availability of interim
storage and the progress toward the development of long term
disposal facilities. In support of its conclusion, the Court first
noted that, despite the NRC's finding that it is safe to continue
to license new reactors, the NRC's finding does not suggest that
it is economically wise to do SO.86 Compliance with both section
25524.2 and federal regulation would be possible because· the
NRC order does not and could not compel a utility to develop a
nuclear plant. 87 The Court observed that the NRC's regulations
are not aimed at determining the economic feasibility of the
construction of a new nuclear plant, but are aimed at insuring
that nuclear plants are safe. 88 The Court again noted that the
statute acknowledges that it is the federal responsibility to develop and license the technology surrounding nuclear waste disposal; thus California did not attempt to impose its own standards on nuclear waste disposal and did not improperly attempt
to enter an occupied field. 8e In addressing an issue not previating license must submit a safety analysis report, which include8 a "radioactive waste
handling system. Under 10 CFR pt. 50 App. A, Criteria 60-64 at 412, regulations specify
design criteria and control requirements for onsite storage and handling of radioactive
waste." The NRC has also promulgated detailed regulations concerning offsite storage
and disposal of radioactive waste. Requirements covering license applications for disposal of high level radioactive waste in geologic repositories also have been promulgated by
the NRC. 10 CFR pt. 60. However, as the Court observed, no permanent disposal facilities have been licensed, and the NRC and the Department of Energy presently authorize
the storage of spent fuel at reactor sites in pools of water.
86. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1724. The NRC maintained in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC that it had to examine only on-site safety risks in
its licensing decisions. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34391 (1978). The economic feasibility of a new
nuclear power plant absent a long term disposal technology was not at issue. In that
case, the Second Circuit limited its discussion to "whether [the] NRC, prior to granting
nuclear power reactor operating licenses, is required by the public health and safety requirements to make a determination ... that high-level radioactive wastes can be permanently disposed of safely." National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 582 F.2d
166, 170 (2nd Cir. 1978).
In declining to find a conflict between § 25524.2 and the NRC's regulations, the
Pacific Gas Court noted that "the NRC's proceeding addressing the extent to which
assessments of waste disposal technology should be factored into NRC reactor licensing
does not address the economic ramifications of this issue." Pacific Gas at 1729. This
matter however, is presently before the Court. See National Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976); rev'd sub nom Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Corp. v. National Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 579, (1978), on remand, 685 F.22d 459
(DC Cir. 1982), cert. granted, _
U.S. _ , 103 S.Ct. 433 (1982).
87. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1729-1730.
88.Id.
89.Id.
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ously discussed in the lower court decisions, the Court held that
the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 198290 did not
create a conflict between federal regulation of waste disposal and
section 25524.2. The Court examined the purpose of this act91
and noted that the bill, inter alia, provides financing for research and development, and authorizes repositories for disposal
of high level waste and spent nuclear fuel, along with provisions
for the licensing and expansion of interim storage.92 However,
the Court concluded through an examination of the legislative
history that "while the passage of this new legislation may convince state authorities that there is now a sufficient federal commitment to fuel storage and waste disposal, . . . it does not appear that Congress intended to make that decision for the states
"98

4. Preemption: Frustration of Purpose
The Court held that section 25524.2 does not frustrate the
Atomic Energy Act's purpose of developing the commercial use
of nuclear power. 9. The Court enunciated the well established
test that "state law is preempted if it 'stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "911 While the Court acknowledged that "the primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act was, and continued to be, the
promotion of nuclear power,"96 the Court held that the promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished "at all costS."97
90. Pub L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982).
91. Section 111(b) lists the following purposes:
(1) to establish a schedule for the siting, construction and operation of repositories that will provide a reasonable assurance
that the public and the environment will be adequately protected from the hazards posed by high-level wastes and ...
spent nuclear fuel . . . . (2) to establish the Federal responsibility, and a definite Federal policy, for the disposal of such
waste and spent fuel . . . .
[d.

92. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1730.
93. [d.
94. Pacific Gas at _ , 103, S.Ct. at 1730-31.
95. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963); Fidelity Federal
U.S. _ , _ , 102 S.Ct. 3014 (1982).
Savings and Loan Assn'n v. de la Cuesta, _
96. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731.
97. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731.
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The Court, however, refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's suggestion that legislation since 1974 has indicated a change in congressional outlook. B8 The Court essentially relied on the rationale that Congress has allowed the States to determine as a
matter of economic feasibility whether a nuclear plant should be
built. 88 In concluding the opinion, the Court stated that it would
not assume the role of Congress and left it to Congress to rethink the division of regulatory authority since the existing regulatory structure in effect allows the states to undercut a federal
objective. 100

B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in
the judgment, but focused his analysis on the Court's suggestion
that a state may not prohibit the construction of nuclear power
plants solely out of concern for the safety aspects of such a
plant. 101 In noting that the Court had found that California's
motivation for enacting section 25524.2 had been a desire to
avoid a potentially economically unfeasible project, he observed
that such language was unnecessary to the Court's holding. 102
Justice Blackmun noted that "Congress has occupied not
the broad field of 'nuclear safety concerns,' but only the narrower area of how a nuclear plant should be constructed and operated to protect against radiation hazards. "103 In noting that
states traditionally have had the authority to choose which technologies will meet their energy needs, the concurrence found no
evidence that Congress had a "clear and manifest purpose"l04 to
"force States to be blind to whatever special dangers are posed
by nuclear plants."lOI1 Essentially, Justice Blackmun adopted the
view that if States were preempted from making an evaluation
of the feasibility of a plant on safety grounds, a regulatory vacuum would be created, and thus the decision whether to build a
nuclear facility would ultimately be made by the utility seeking
98. Id. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1731.
99. Id. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731.
100. Id. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731-32.
101. Id. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1732.
102. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1732.
103. Id. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1732.
104. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
105. PG & E Co. v. Energy Res. Comm'n, _
U.S. at _ , 103 S.Ct at 1733.
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its construction,108 rather than the state affected.
Justice Blackmun observed that a flat ban on the construction of nuclear plants for health and safety reasons would not
conflict with the NRC's judgment that construction of nuclear
plants may safely proceed. He reasoned that because the NRC
has only held that construction may safely proceed, and neither
the NRC or Congress had mandated the states to construct nuclear plants, compliance with both state and federal regulation
would still be possible.l07
Justice Blackmun voiced the opinion that a safety-initiated
ban on the construction of new plants would not stand as an
obstacle to accomplishment and execution of the objective of
Congress to make nuclear energy available to the states. lOS The
Justice reasoned that "the Atomic Energy Act was intended to
promote the technological development of nuclear power, at a
time when there was no private nuclear industry." Moreover,
Justice Blackmun observed that "Congress did not compel states
to give preference to the eventual product of that industry or to
ignore the peculiar problems associated with the product."lOe
Justice Blackmun noted that the legislative history of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974110 expressed concern about a
pro-nuclear bias in the regulatory agency.1ll With the passage of
the Act, promotional and regulatory functions in the area of nuclear power were separated by the creation of the NRC and the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).ll2
The Justice added that the Reorganization Act and subsequent
legislation allowing the states to prohibit the construction of nuclear plants for non-nuclear reasons are manifestations of Congress' intent that nuclear power remain an option to the states
but "that the decision whether to build nuclear plants remains
106. For a similar view see Wiggins, Federalism, Balancing and the Burger Court:
California's Nuclear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D.L. REV. 3, 64 (1979).
107. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1733.
108. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1733.
109. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1734.
110. 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891.
111. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1734.
112. The Act provided that the NRC would assume the regulatory and licensing
function of the AEC. See 42 U.S.C. § 5341. Under Section 5801(a), ERDA was created to
"develop, and increase the efficiency and reliability of use of, all energy sources." In
1977, ERDA's functions were transferred to the Department of Energy. 91 Stat 577, 42
U.S.C. § 7151(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
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with the States."us Justice Stevens concluded by asserting that
"a ban on construction of nuclear plants would be valid even if
its authors were motivated by fear of a core meltdown or other
nuclear catastrophe. "114
IV.

CRITIQUE

The Court's decision in Pacific GasUl'> is a sound but
conservative interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and its subsequent amendments.
Justice White's application of the Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp.U8 preemption test shows that Congress intended to maintain a dual regulatory system which restricts the NRC's authority to national security, health, and safety, while preserving the
traditional state police power to regulate its utilities and the
generation of electrical power. Despite this thorough preemption
analysis, many questions concerning this delicate state-federal
balance remain.

A.

When State Law Will be Preempted

The Pacific Gas Court impliedly indicated that the threepart Rice test should be applied to all state legislation that directly or indirectly affects the construction or operation of nuclear power plants. Hence, the traditional powers of the States
to regulate electrical power will not be superseded unless the
States' legislation is aimed at regulating the construction or operation of the plant themselves,117 or in fact affects the NRC's
113. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1734. Justice Blaclunun concluded that Congress has continued to promote alternative sources of energy such as coal and small
cogenerative and other small power facilities, without giving preference to nuclear power.
See e.g., Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3291, 42 U.S.C. §§
8301 et seq. (1976 ed. Supp. IV); Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, § 210,
92 Stat. 3144, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
It is also well established the States have the authority to establish siting and land
use requirements for nuclear plants that are more stringent than those of the NRC. Ct.,
NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal 190, Pub. L., 96-295, § 103(0, 94 Stat. 783 (1980), and
under the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments, the States may regulate radioactive air emissions and impose more stringent standards than those of the NRC. See 42 U.S.C. §§
7416,7422 (1983 Ed. & Supp. IV).
114. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1734.
115. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731.
116. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
117. See e.g. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F.Supp. 399,404-
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authority to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear
power plant, or would stand as an obstacle to the "promotion of
nuclear power."118 Referring to the Vermont Yankee 119 decision,
the Court stated: "There is little doubt that under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar
bodies are empowered to make the initial decision regarding the
need for power."120 While the Court found that sections 271121
and 274122 of the Act expressly allowed the states to retain this
power, the Court also found that the "federal government has
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the
limited powers expressly limited to the States."l23 This language
suggests that state action regulating nuclear plants will be preempted if the federal government has not provided an exception
for this type of regulation.
Additionally, despite finding that "a primary purpose of the
Atomic Energy Act was, and continues to be the promotion of
nuclear power,"m the Court concluded that section 25524.2 did
not "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"121i since the "promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished at all costs. "128 Therefore
the analysis applied to section 25524.2 acknowledges that states
have retained the right initially to decide the need for the construction of nuclear plants on economic reasons, but prevents
state regulation in any area not expressly ceded to the states
that would arguably either affect the NRC's authority to regulate the safety aspects of the construction and operation of a
plant or would stand as an obstacle to the "promotion of nuclear
power." This analysis suggests that once a plant is built, the
state is powerless to regulate a commercial plant which the state
405 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
118. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731.
119. 435 U.S. 519 (1977).
120. [d. at 550.
121. 42 U.S.C. 2018, see Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1724.
122. 42 U.S.C. 2021(c), see Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1724.
123. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1724, In addition to the authority under §
274(c) to regulate certain low-level radiological materials, Congress has allowed the states
to impose certain siting and land use requirements for nuclear plants. See e.g., Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Station, Unit No.2) ALAB-453,
7 N.R.C. 31, 34 n.13 (1978).
124. Pacific Gas at _ , S.Ct. at 1731.
125. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731.
126. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731.
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believes to be harmful to its citizens.
Notwithstanding the application of this preemption analysis, the extent of state power still remains unclear. While the
.dicta in the opinion suggests that "safety" is an area in which
the states may not regulate nuclear facilities, the Court nevertheless observed that the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act allows the states to exercise their "traditional authority
over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking and the
like. "l27 In conjunction with this, however, the Court broadly
stated that the states will be preempted, if "the matter on which
the state asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the
federal government."128
The Court also specifically observed that a prohibition on
nuclear construction for safety reasons would be an obstacle to
Congress' objective "that nuclear technology be safe enough for
widespread development and use. "129 This suggests that any future legislation which for health and safety concerns attempts to
either prohibit construction of a new plant, or, alternatively, to
decommission existing plants,130 would be preempted not only as
conflicting with a field already occupied by the NRC, but for
blocking the federal goal of promoting nuclear power. Accordingly the language of the opinion suggests that only by finding
that the continued operation of a plant will be economically unfeasible would a state have a proper rationale to prohibit construction or independently request the decommission of a nuclear power plant181 out of health concerns for the nuclear waste
127. [d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1726.
128. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1730-31.
129. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731.
130. In a June, 1983 NRC study, the Commission estimated that thirty-nine plants
in nineteen States will be required to shut down for lack of storage space. See H. REP.
97-735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982) (federal govt. waste management policies can be
seen to have exacerbated or created a spent fuel bottleneck; growing inventories of spent
fuel at the power nuclear sites have heightened public concern); 128 CONGo BEc. H8169
(Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Broyhill); 128 CONGo REc. H8170 (Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead) ("comprehensive nuclear waste disposal must provide not only
for the long-term problem of nuclear waste but it must also alleviate the short-term
problem of a lack of interim storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel").
131. The NRC currently expects to issue in 1984 a proposed rule dealing with
decommissioning of nuclear power plants. See In the Matter of Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station) 18 NRC 152 (1983). The NRC has
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disposal problem.

B. The Court's Analysis of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982
These guidelines do not at the present time suggest that
other states will be powerless to act to prohibit construction, or,
in the event of a critical storage problem, request that a commercial plant be closed down.182 The Court observed that, subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982133 (Waste Policy Act). The Waste
Policy Act expresses a federal commitment to create more shortterm spent fuel storage and to provide for the development of
long term disposal through a federally financed research and development program. 134 In conjunction with this, the Court's inquiry centered on whether or not the Waste Policy Act preempted California's legislation by exhibiting enough of a federal
commitment to the storage problem, that the accumulation of
fuel would not pose an economic problem and construction
would be able to resume. The Court concluded that, despite this
federal commitment, Congress itself had not intended to make
the decision for the states that the nuclear waste disposal system
problem had been resolved. 18G
Therefore, a legislature which conducts the proper economic
studies and concludes that it would be economically infeasible to
continue to operate a plant could conceivably pass a valid law
requesting a moratorium on construction or, in the event of a
severe storage problem, decommission. 13s All of this would depend on the technological advances of the federal government in
searching for the solution to the problem of long term disposal.
determined in the "Waste Confidence" Rulemaking Decision, 44 Fed. Reg. 61372, that
there is a "reasonable assurance" that spent fuel can be stored safely in storage basins at
reactor sites for an extended period of time until the availability of geologic repositories
for safe, permanent disposal. See 48 Fed. Register 22730 (May 20, 1983).
132. See supra note 124, 130; see also note 167, infra.
133. Pub L 97-425, 96 Stat 2201 (1982). Under this act, utilities are required, inter
alia to contract with the Department of Energy and provide prepayment for waste disposal services that will ultimately require. See 48 Fed. Reg. 22730 (May 20, 1983).
134. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731. See also H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3792.
135. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731.
136. See supra note 124, 130; see also infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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A NRC determination that an adequate long term disposal
method exists could prohibit such a law from being valid.1S7

C. Pacific Gas Compared to Earlier Preemption Decisions
The Supreme Court in Pacific Gas rendered a judgment
which is consistent with other preemption decisions. However,
the Court's dicta prohibiting states from acting out of safety
concerns that might arguably affect plant construction or operation in an ancillary manner unnecessarily deprives the states of
their traditional regulatory power left to the states under the
dual regulatory system created by Congress.
During the late 1960's, the AEC urged that environmental
concerns were the "exclusive concerns" of the states and could
not be taken into account during AEC licensing. However, in
New Hampshire v. AEC,1S8 the First Circuit held that the AEC
would not be relieved of its duty to comply with authorities who
must deal with thermal effects of atomic power plant discharges. lss Similarly, in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,140 the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota was preempted
from imposing more stringent standards on the level of radioactive discharges than required by the AEC.I41 However, in focus137. See supra note 125, 131.
138. 406 F.2d 170, (1st Cir., 1969), cert. den. 395 U.S. 962, (1969)
139. 406 F.2d at 175-76, cert. den., 397 U.S. 962.
140. 447 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir., 1971), a!f'd memo U.S. 1035. Despite an acknowledgment by the Supreme Court that the Pacific Gas opinion was "fully consistent" with
Northern States, the Court included the caveat that the summary affirmance of the
Northern States holding "is not to be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting
the judgments under review." [d.
141. 447 F.2d at 1150. Other courts have viewed the Atomic Energy Act as preempting only state regulations aimed at radioactive hazards. See e.g., Marshall V. Consumers
Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237 N.W. 2d 266 (1975) (plaintiff had standing to sue nuclear
plant for nuisance due to steam, fog and ice carried by the plant's cooling pond); New
Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection V. Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 69 N.J.
102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976) (state regulation conflicting with the AEC preempted, but not
all state regulations of nuclear plants for all purposes); Northern California Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor, Inc. V. Public Utilities Comm'n, 61 Cal.2d 126, 133,37
Cal. Rptr. 432, 436, 390 P.2d 200, 204 (1964) (State can prevent reactor from being built
in an earthquake zone since "safety considerations in addition to radiation hazards were
involved."). But see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania V. General Public Utilities Corp.
710 F.2d 117, 120 (3rd Cir. 1983) (plaintiff who based a public nuisance claim arising out
of Three Mile Island incident could not obtain injunctive relief to close the plant since
the federal government has, under Pacific Gas holding, "sole and exclusive" ju·
risdiction.").
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ing on the power of the States to regulate non-radiation hazards,
the Northern States court observed that" [C]ongress was not by
[including] subsection (c) of the 1959 Amendment, in any way
further limiting the power of the States to regulate activities,
other than radiation hazards . . . ."142
The Pacific Gas opinion is not consistent with the policy
underlying these lower court opinions. While the Court acknowledges that states have traditionally possessed the express authority to determine what type of commercial plant an individual state needs to construct in order to meet its energy needs,u3
the Court nevertheless concludes that a state may not exercise
its traditional police powers by considering any health and
safety factors when deciding what type of technology is appropriate, due to the pervasiveness of the federal government in the
safety area. Thus, while Congress has never expressly indicated
that the states may not consider these factors when deciding if it
is appropriate to built a commercial nuclear plant, states seeking
to avoid this judicially created roadblock to the consideration of
the health and safety or environmental effects must provide an
economic rationale since "the matter on which the State asserts
the right to act is . . . regulated by the federal government but
there has been no federal regulation of the economic considerations of nuclear power."U4
This departure from the approach of the two prior decisions
is unsettling because the Court is, in essence, denying the states
the traditional authority to decide when the social, political, environmental and health benefits of a power plant (as well as economic) are outweighed by those same risks. As Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion, "the Court has read too
much into the Act, in suggesting that the Act prohibits the
States from determining what types of electrical power to utilize."uli Moreover, by concluding that the federal government has
occupied the"entire field of safety,"U6 the Court will have essentially shifted the burden to the States to prove that their legislation occupies a narrow enough area to be considered as not con142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

447 F.2d at 1150.
Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. 17-23.
[d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 17-26.
[d. at _,103 S.Ct. at 1713.
[d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1730-1731.
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flicting generally with the established federal regulatory areas of
construction and operation, or not conflicting specifically with
the NRC determination that nuclear energy is "safe". Hence, despite Congress' intent that the states not lose any traditional
powers, states must avoid the "entire area" of safety that is not
expressly provided for as an exception by Congress.
Thus, the Pacific Gas court's narrowing of the preemption
inquiry not only suggests a departure from previous decisions
that states may enact health or environmental legislation which
does not conflict with federal safety regulation, but sends a clear
message to the States on how to avoid this judicially created
obstacle.

D. The Moratorium As A Frustration of Congressional
Purpose
1.

Majority Opinion

Concerning the petitioner's challenge that a moratorium on
construction would frustrate the Atomic Energy Act's purpose to
develop the commercial use of nuclear power, the Court concluded that the primary purpose of the Act continues to be the
promotion of nuclear power.14'1 While there is little doubt that
Congress sought to encourage private industry to enter the field,
the Court failed to follow its own rule stated in Pennhurst
School and Hospital v. Halderman: 148 "[I]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law and its object and policy."l49 In this
respect, the Ninth Circuit failed to convince the Court that the
Congressional goal of promoting development of alternative energy sources and the restructuring of the federal regulatory
agencies by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 was an indication of a change in the Congressional outlook for a more "balanced approach" to nuclear power development.
Viewed as a whole, this portion of the Court's findings are
the least sound. This portion of the Court's opinion is the most
conservative and indicates a political posture in support of nu147. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1730-31.
148. 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981).
149. [d.
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clear power. The Act gives the states the authority to keep the
plants from being built if the planned plant is inconsistent with
a state's power needs, or environmental or other interests. Moreover, as the Court noted, a state may through its zoning powers
deny a land use permit or could refuse to issue certificates of
public convenience.lIiO These powers are themselves indicia of
Congress' intent to allow a state to decide not only whether a
plant is economically feasible, but if it is appropriate for their
citizens. In Vermont Yankee/Ill the Court states: "Time may
prove wrong the decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is
Congress or the States within their appropriate agencies which
must eventually make that judgment."U2 Notwithstanding this
dicta and the Pacific Gas Court's concession that "nuclear power
is not to be accomplished "at all costs,"lII3 the Pacific Gas Court
appears to have retreated from a neutral position by concluding
that recent legislation has not changed the federal goal of promoting nuclear power.
Congress' recent activities in this area, such as the reorganization of the federal regulatory agencies in 1974,lIi4 the permitting of states to subject nuclear plants to state health regulations no less stringent than those applicable to other energy
sources,lIill and the Nuclear Waste Act of 1982,lII6 could not real150. Pacific Gas at _ , n.18, 103 S.Ct. at 1724, n.18.
151. 435 U.S. 519 (1977).
152. [d. at 558.
153. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1731.
154. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U.S.C. 5801-5891.
155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422 [hereinafter cited as section 122]. As part of the 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments, the states and the EPA inter alia under section 122 have the
authority to set air quality standards and emission levels for the control of radioactive
air pollutants for purposes of protecting public health. Because radioactive emissions are
deemed to be air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, the states have the authority to
regulate such emissions independently. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 [hereinafter cited as Section 116]. However a state's standards may not be less stringent than those required by
the E.P.A. Section 116 provides in part: .
[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of
any state ... to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution except
. . . any emission standard or limitation which is less stringent
[than one already required by the EPA].
In turn, the EPA's requirements may be vetoed by the NRC upon a determination that
"the application of such standard or limitation to a source or facility within the jurisdiction of the [NRC] would endanger public health or safety." Clean Air Act § 122(c)(3), 42
U.S.C.A. § 7 4 2 2 ( c ) ( 3 ) . '
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istically indicate a desire by Congress to promote the industry.
Rather, the preemption of state regulation was necessary to protect the public from the radiological hazards of nuclear power. U7
Despite Congress' recent legislation, the Court has chosen to interpret Congress' inaction in amending the Act as indicating
that Congress never intended the states to provide protection to
citizens. Thus, any state action in the 1980's has a strong chance
of conflicting with a federal goal mandated in 1954, if that state
action contains "anti-nuclear sentiment" or questions the policies of the industry as a whole.
2. Concurrence
Justice Blackmun would have refused to find that a safetymotivated prohibition on construction would be preempted, opting to reach that issue when it is necessary to disposition of the
case. IllS Additionally, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority that such a prohibition would be improper. In support of
his finding that the dicta was wrong, Justice Blackmun found
that the area occupied by the federal government was limited to
the "narrower area of how a plant should be constructed and
operated to protect against radiation hazards "l1l9 and the Act
void of any language indicating a clear and manifest purpose to
prohibit states from considering safety aspects when exercising
their traditional authority to choose which technology to rely on
in meeting their energy needs. 160 This concurrence voices the
concerns of other commentators that unless the states are allowed to address the risks associated with nuclear power, the decision of whether to build a plant, and the benefits of continuing
to operate it will be left to the utilities seeking to build and operate a plant. 161
However, §§ 116 and 122 of the Clean Air Act demonstrates an explicit manifestation
from Congress that the States may regulate nuclear energy activity in order to protects
its citizenry. [d.
156. H.R. REP. No. 3809, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess 26-29, (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3792-94.
157. See generally, S. REP. No. 370, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, (1959), reprinted in
1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2872, 2879-80.
158. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1732.
159. [d. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1732-1733.
160. [d.
161. See Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California's Nuclear Law As A Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.P.L. REv. 3, 64 (1979).
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In criticizing the majority's conclusion that a ban on construction for safety reasons would stand as an obstacle to the
goals of Congress to encourage the development of nuclear
power, Justice Blackmun took a more balanced view of the goals
of Congress by focusing on the recent acts of Congress. Justice
Blackmun, in observing that Congress has not evidenced a dictatorial intent for every State to build nuclear plants,"IS2 would
have found that the recent legislation not only allows states to
prohibit the construction of nuclear plants, but indicates a Congressional purpose to "place greater relative emphasis on nonnuclear energy.utSS Yet, Justice Blackmun avoided the issue of
whether a state prohibition on safety grounds would conflict
with a NRC judgment that it was safe to construct or operate a
plant by stating that a "flat ban for safety reasons . . . would
not make compliance with federal and state regulations . . . a
physical impossibility."!M
'
While Justice Blackmun correctly notes that neither the
NRC nor Congress has mandated that the states conclude that
con"struction is "safe,"!6& the concurrence leaves unanswered how
a conflict would be avoided should a state conclude that a
plant's construction would be unsafe in· light of the unresolved
disposal problems. Thus, Justice Blackmun's failure to articulate
which safety motivated legislation would cause a conflict which
arguably undermines his position.

V.

THE TROUBLES WITH STOCKPILED WASTE: WHAT CHOICES
REMAIN FOR THE STATES IN THE FUTURE?

As the midpoint of this decade approaches, states and their
consumers are faced with the prospect of nuclear power plants
being. decommissioned due to a lack of interim storage space
caused by the federal government's inability to develop a permanent disposal method. ISS The possibility of shutdowns will comat _,103 S.Ct. at 1734.
at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1733.
at _,103 S.Ct. at 1733.
at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1733-34.
166: See supra note 130 and accompanYing test; See also, U.S. Charts Plans for
Nuclear Waste Disposal, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS. v. 61, July 18, 1983 (describing controversy surrounding disposal of spent fuel; first waste depository not scheduled to open
until 1998).
162.
163.
164.
165.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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pel states to reexamine their economic commitments to nuclear
power. IS? In conjunction with this, the states may also move to
protect the health and safety of its citizens in the event that the
federal government is unable to develop a permanment method
of disposal contemplated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. lsS
Thus, the disposal problem may bring about litigation in which
some states will attempt to exercise their traditional police
power by ordering the utilities to close or decommission plants.
This section will consider the consequences if, in the future, California's nuclear provisions result in the de facto exclusion of
nuclear power plants.

A. A Finding by the Energy Commission that Adequate
Facilities to Store Spent Fuel Rods Does Not Exist
Due to the federal government's rejection of reprocessing as
a viable alternative,lse states such as California will ultimately
have to silence the assertions by critics of nuclear power that
accumulating nuclear wastes pose both a health risk and
financial burden on the ratepayers. no In the event that the fed167. The estimate of the number of plants that will be required to close down due to
a lack of space vary. See e.g. 7 ENVIR. REP. (DNA) 839 (1977) (twenty three plants by
1987). However in a June, 1983 study, the NRC estimated that thirty-nine plants in
nineteen states will be required to shutdown for lack of storage space. See infra note 130.
In California, the Humboldt Bay plant closed in 1976 for "overall review" and possible strengthening of the seismic supports. In December, 1980, Pacific Gas and Electric
withdrew its application to reopen the plant, leaving the status of the plant in limbo. See
Decommissioning Nuclear Plants Isn't Easy, San Francisco Chronicle, March 14, 1982.
There are three accepted methods of decommissioning: Inlmediate dismanteling,
mothballing it for thirty years or so, and entombing it in a substance like concrete for a
century. Id. As for the costs of a shutdown, while it is clear that the consumers will pay
for it, the amount to be paid in millions of dollars is still unclear. See e.g., The Cost of a
Shutdown: An Unclear Bottom Line, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1983 at I, col. 1 (describing the
consequences if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered the shutdown of Indian
Point Units 2 and 3).
168. During the 1975-1976 legislative seBBions, fifty bills were introduced in twentyfour state legislatures having the effect of restricting or prohibiting the development and
use of nuclear power. See Murphy and Lapierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation In
The States And The Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 392 (1976); See also Justices Uphold States In Barring Nuclear Plants, Wall
Street J., April 21, 1983, at 4, col. 1 (describing how Pacific Gas ruling implictly clears
laws in five other states and probably will encourage other legislatures to p888 similar
laws).
169. See supra note 130.
170. See e.g., San Onofre A-Plant Pains, ENGINEERING NEWS RECORD, v. 211, at 38
(1983) (describing how Public Utilities Commission is investigating seismic and safety
benefits); Showdown at Diablo Canyon, Newsweek, August 10, 1981 at 51-52 (describing
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eral government fails to meet the deadlines set in the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982, California could, under section
25524.l(b), find that one or several of the plants lack sufficient
interim storage space. Alternatively, California arguably could
decide that the benefits its ratepayers receive by having an operating reactor are outweighed by the potentially unsafe and economically staggering consequences of allowing waste to stockpile
at an ever-increasing rate. 1 ?1 If California unilaterally decides to
order the decommissioning of one or several nuclear reactors,
the delicate regulatory scheme reviewed by the Pacific Gas court
will again have to be evaluated.172
1.

Closure of a Plant on Economic Grounds

It is indisputable after the Pacific Gas opinion that under
subsection k of section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, the states
retain authority to regulate nuclear energy activities for a variety of non-radiation purposes that relate to the generation, sale,
or transmission of electric power. 173 However, in conjunction
with this, a state order to close a nuclear plant may imply an
ancillary concern over radiation for two reasons. First, a state
arguably would be instructing the federal government how to
operate the plant by ordering the utility or NRC to close the
plant. Second, an order by a state to close the plant could arguably conflict with the Congressional goal of "the promotion of nucost overruns, preparation by police authorities in anticipation of thousands of arrests,
and location of plant 2 V2 miles from a major earthquake fault); Diablo Canyon Protest,
San Francisco Chron., April 16, 1984, at 11, col. 1 (describing arrests of 23 people after
NRC voted to grant license to test low-level power capability). As this article went to
publication, a suit had been filed in the Washington D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to
block any testing at Diablo. The opponents of Diablo allege that the Commission, inter
alia, failed to require a number of environmental and safety studies required of other
plants in the event of a core meltdown, and that the Commission failed to adequately
address the effects of a major earthquake. See Diablo Foes Appeal To Block Testing,
San Francisco Chron., April 17, 1984, at 5, col. 1. For every day that the Diablo plant is
not on-line, the consumers of Pacific Gas and Electric pay $1,000,000 in interest costs.
See Scientists OK Testing of Diablo Reactor, San Francisco Chron., April 7, 1984, at 12,
·col. 1.
171. Even where all nuclear power plants shut down, there still would be forty years
accumulation of radioactive work to deal with. See, U.S. Charts Plans for Nuclear
Waste Disposal, CHEMICAL & ENG. NEWS, July 18, 1983 at 20.
172. In Pacific Gas, Section 25524.1(b) was found not to be ripe for review. See
supra notes 1-42 and accompanying text.
173. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct at 1725.
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clear power."l74
However, in light of the language in Pacific Gas, a statute or
referendum to close a nuclear plant should be within the power
of a state, despite a challenge on grounds of preemption. In reviewing the Atomic Energy Act, one finds that the Act and its
amendments are void of any express preemptory language. Second, while federal regulation of the operation of a commercial
plant is pervasive, a request by a state to close down a plant
would not physically interfere with the actual operation. Moreover, even the utilities would be hard pressed to argue successfully that the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to
infer that Congress intended that states, under section 274(k),
could not exercise their traditional power to supply adequate
service at reasonable rates. In conjunction with this, it would
seem illogical for a reviewing court to determine that a state
could decide, under section 274(k), the initial need for a generating facility, but after the construction of the plant, the same
state would be prevented from deciding that its continued operation would be uneconomical.
Notwithstanding the holding in Pacific Gas that California's
decision to prohibit construction did not conflict or stand as an
obstacle to Congress' purpose to "develop nuclear power," a
state attempting to close plants would face a challenge that the
state action stands as an obstacle to Congress' goal. In addressing this argument, the states should reiterate that the NRC has
not determined that it would be economically wise to continue
to operate a commercial plant, nor has the NRC the power to
compel a state to continue to operate a plant. 171i Thus, if California eventually seeks to halt the operation of a plant, it would be
well-advised to develop an economic rationale for doing so.
2.

Closure of a Plant on Safety Grounds

In the wake of the Three Mile Island incident178 and other
174. Id. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1730-31. See supra note 96.
175. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
176. See Fantasy Island, 75 Philadelphia Magazine, March 1984 at 86 (Describing
the state of conditions at the Three Mile Island plant, five years after the worst nuclear
accident in American history).
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reports of danger associated with the use of nuclear power, 177
public support for nuclear power has dropped steadily; people
throughout the nation are opposed to nuclear power for safety
reasons. 178 The possibility of another mishap similar to Three
Mile Island, or a new environmental crisis spurned by neglect of
stockpiling waste remains engrained in the consciousness of both
scientist and civilian alike. State action to close nuclear plants
out of environmental or even psychological concerns l79 (arising
from the stress associated with a hazard among the community),
remains a viable and realistic alternative to states dissatisfied
with nuclear power.
Under Pacific Gas, such a state action would be subject to a
preemption challenge. The Pacific Gas Court stated in dicta
that "the federal government maintains complete control of the
safety and 'nuclear' aspects of the construction and operation of
a plant. "180 Hence, Pacific Gas can be interpreted to hold that if
a conflict would arise as to a judgment of whether nuclear power
was "safe," the states would be preempted from pursuing a state
action grounded in safety concerns. 18I However, this dicta is subject to challenge on several grounds.
177. See e.g., 5 Atomic Plants Ordered Shut to Inspect Pipes for Cracks, N.Y.
Times, July 15, 1983 at 42, col. 1 (describing order to close five plants due to cracks in
cooling pipes; ~rder follows discovery of cracks in cooling pipes in thirteen other plants,
seven of which were also closed). See also U.S. Sees Questions For Three Mile Island,
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1983 at 9, col. 1 (describing conclusions of Nuclear RegUlatory
Commission staff members that they can no longer vouch for the integrity and ability of
the operators of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.
See, also Bleak Future Described For Nuclear Power, San Francisco Chron. Feb. 7, 1984
(Polls show a drastic drop in public acceptance with twice as many people now opposing
the building of new plants).
178. See e.g., Hundreds Arrested at New Hampshire Atom Protest, N.Y. Times,
May 2, 1977 at I, col. 1; 150 Protestors at A-Plant Arrested, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 7,
1983, at 3, col. 1See also Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., __ U.S. __, __ , n.12, 104 S.Ct. 615, 639
n.12, in which Justice Powell acknowledged the dramatic increase in public concerns over
all nuclear activities.
179. See, Fantasy Island, 75 Philadelphia Magazine, March, 1984, at 86. (Describing effects of accident on local populace); See also Metropolitan Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear Energy, __ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 1556 (1983). In that case, the
Supreme Court reversed a finding by the Third Circuit that NEP A required the NRC to
consider the psychological health damage from the>risk of nuclear accidents to local residents that restarting one of the units would cause. Id. at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1562-63.
180. Pacific Gas at __, 103 S.Ct. at 1726.
181. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/6

34

Howard: Nuclear Plant Construction

NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION

1984]

393

First, as Justice Blackmun noted in the Pacific Gas concurrence,182 Congress has only decided how a plant should be built
and operated to protect against radiation hazards; the Atomic
Energy Act is void of any clear and manifest purpose to require
states to ignore dangers which pose an environmental threat, or
impose psychological stress on its citizens. Moreover, as the Pacific Gas Court noted, the NRC has not determined that states
must operate nuclear plants, only that it is safe to do SO.188
A challenge to a state action to close down a plant for safety
reasons would find strong support in the dicta of Pacific Gas,
where the majority stated:
At the outset, we emphasize that [section 25524.2]
does not seek to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear power plant. It would clearly
be impermissible for California to attempt to do
so, for such regulation, even if enacted out of nonsafety concerns, would nevertheless directly conflict with the NRC's exclusive authority over
plant construction and operation. Respondents do
broadly argue however, that although safety regulation of nuclear plants by states is forbidden, a
state may completely prohibit new construction
until its safety concerns are satisfied by the federal government. We reject this line of reasoning.
State safety regulation is not preempted only
when it conflicts with federal law. Rather, the federal government has occupied the entire field of
nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers
expressly ceded to the states. When the federal
government completely occupies a given field or
an identifiable portion of it, as it has done here,
the test of preemption is whether "the matter on
any
which the state asserts the right to act is
way regulated by the federal government."l84

in

Clearly, the dicta in Pacific Gas is dangerously broad and
could deprive states of a lawful exercise of their police power. By
requesting the closure of a plant for safety reasons, California
would not be seeking to interfere with the technically difficult
182. Pacific Gas at 1732-1733.
183. See id. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1724.
184. Id. at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1726 (citation and footnote omitted).
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job of operating a plant and containing the waste from it; rather,
a state would be deciding that the physical health of its citizens
endangered by potential radiation leaks and the intangible psychological problems created state-wide by the anxieties surrounding a potential public hazard are not worth the continued
operation of a plant. As the Pacific Gas Court observed, states
have been given the opportunity to impose more stringent standards in the area of air pollution,186 and siting and land use requirements. 188 It appears arbitrary for the Pacific Gas Court to
hold that California may prevent a nuclear power plant from being constructed in a densely populated or seismically unstable
area and thereafter regulate emissions from the plant, but that
same state could not protect its citizens for health and psychological reasons only because Congress, through its inaction, has
failed to· include such an express delegation of power in the
Atomic Energy Act. Moreover, a state, seeking to close a plant
could argue that their action is a rejection of a source of electric
power; clearly under section 271 187 a state has the power to make
such a traditional regulatory decision. As long as it is uncertain
what permanent disposal method the federal government will
develop, the increasing volume of stored wastes poses an environmental hazard to its citizens of both present and future generations. 188 A state should not be deprived of the power to decide what method of generating electricity is most appropriate
for its environment, simply because of federal occupation of the
safety of operating a plant.
B. Impact of the Pacific Gas Dicta After the Silkwood
Decision

There are further considerations of consequences of the
wide reaching dicta of the Pacific Gas court that the federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,
except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states. In
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.189 the Court concluded in a five
to four decision that a state-authorized award of punitive dam185.
186.
187.
188.
empted?
189.

See supra note 155, and accompanying text.
See supra note 117, and accompanying text.
See supra, note 59.
See Tribe, California Declines The Nuclear Gamble: Is Such A Choice Pre7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 717 n.158 (1979).
_
U.S. _ , 104 S.Ct. 615 (1984). [hereinafter cited 88 Silkwood]
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ages,190 which arose out of the escape of plutonium from a federally-licensed nuclear facility,191 'was not preempted by the
Atomic Energy Act or the Price Anderson Act. 192 In Silkwood,
the majority observed that the Pacific Gas holding "that the
federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear
safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to
the states,"19S was not dispositive of the issue of whether the
state authorized award of punitive damages was preempted,
since inter alia, "the right of the State courts to establish . . .
liability . . . [was] maintained,194 . . . even though [Congress]
was aware of the NRC's exclusive authority to regulate safety
matters. 196
In conjunction with this, while the majority noted that there
would be instances in which the federal law would preempt the
recovery of damages based on state law, the majority observed
that "preemption should not be judged on the basis that the
federal government has so completely occupied the field of
safety that state remedies are foreclosed, but on whether there is
an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a dam190. An award of punitive damages was considered by the Tenth Circuit to be "regulatory" for two reasons. First, "any state action that competes with the AEC (NRC) in
its regulation of radiation hazards "[is] impermissible." Silkwood, 667 F.2d 908, 923
(1Oth Cir. 1981). Second, because "a judicial award of exemplary damages under state
law as punishment for bad practices or to deter future practices. . . is not less intrusive
than direct legislative acts of that state. [d.
191. Karen Silkwood was employed by Kerr McGee Nuclear Corp., a subsidiary of
Kerr McGee Corp., as a laboratory analyst at an Oklahoma plant which fabricated plutonium fuel pins for use as reactor fuel in nuclear power plants. Silkwood was contaminated by plutonium over a three day period in 1974; on the third night she was killed in
an unrelated accident. The administrator of her estate brought a diversity action. based
on common law tort principles under Oklahoma law, in order to recover for the injuries
to Karen's person and property. See, __ U.S. __, __, 104 S.Ct. 615, 618 (1984); See
also RACHKE, THE KILLING OF KAREN SILKWOOD (1982)
192. Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). See Silkwood at __, 104 S.Ct. at 623.
"The Price Anderson Act was passed in response to the nuclear industry's concern over
potentially bankrupting state-lawsuits arising out of a nuclear incident. The Act required
that operators of a commercial facility obtain $60 million in private financial protection;
the government would then provide indemnification for the next $500 million of liability,
and the resulting $560 million would be the limit of liability for anyone nuclear
incident."
.
193. Pacific Gas at __ , 103 S.Ct. at 1726.
194. Silkwood at __ , 104 S.Ct. at 624.
195. [d. at __ , 104 S.Ct. at 625.
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ages action would frustrate the objectives of the federallaw. Hl96
Hence, after Silkwood, the analysis of a majority of the Court
does not appear to be an inquiry into whether a specific state
action was expressly ceded to the states, but whether the state
action will conflict with the federal standards or frustrate the
purposes or objectives of the Atomic Energy Act. 197

C. State Action to Close Nuclear Plants As An· Obstacle
To Congressional Intent
Under both Pacific Gas and Silkwood, a reviewing court
must consider whether the state action conflicts with federal law
by making compliance with both laws impossible or by the state
law standing as an obstacle to the accomplishment of a purpose
of Congress. In addressing this problem, a court should not simply confine its inquiry to the question of whether both laws can
be physically complied with, for it is clear that the utilities and
the NRC have the capability of turning a plant off or keeping it
on line. Rather, the real issues before a reviewing court are social, political and economic. In addressing such issues the court
must consider the opposition of the people themselves to nuclear
power, for such opposition has become increasingly vocal over
the past decade. 19s The court must also consider the concern of
the state and its obligation to protect the unborn of future generations. In conjunction with this, however, the court must consider the reality of economics and the billions of dollars that
have been invested in the industry to the utilities and the ratepayers themselves.
196. [d. at _ , 104 S.Ct. at 626.
197. In a strong three point dissent, Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Blackmun, first reiterated the dicta in Pacific Gas that "Congress has occupied
entirely the field of nuclear safety concerns." Silkwood at _ , 104 S.Ct. at 634-635.
Second, Justice Powell noted that there was no express language in either the Atomic
Energy Act or the Price-Anderson Act which allowed a state-authorized punitive damage
award against the nuclear industry. [d. at _ , 104 S.Ct. at 637. Third, the dissenters
rejected as unfounded the majority's reliance on 'indirect evidence' of a congressional
intent not to preempt the state-authorized award. [d.
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, concluded that the
Silkwood decision "wreaks havoc" with the federal regulatory system. [d., at _ , 104
S.Ct. at 627. In addressing the Pacific Gas decision, Justice Blackmun observed that
"the fundamental teaching of Pacific Gas is that state regulation of nuclear power is
preempted to the extent that its purpose is to regulate safety." [d. at 104 S.Ct. at 628.
198. See supra note 178.
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Despite the language of the Pacific Gas court and the
Silkwood dissent, for a number of reasons the issue is one of the
states' power to determine their destiny. Clearly, there is no express language in the Atomic Energy Act which states that the
individual states must have nuclear power; the only edict from
the federal government has been the NRC's determination that
nuclear power is "safe."199 In conjunction with this, the reviewing court should consider that the Atomic Energy Act was
drafted in the mid-1950's in a different economic setting and at
a time when no single member of Congress anticipated the waste
problems that exist today. A review of the legislative history
reveals that the federal government maintained strict control
over the infant industry for defense purposes and to assure that
the technical difficulties associated with commercial nuclear generation of electricity would be met. 200 In light of serious waste
problems associated with nuclear power, a court should not conclude that the purpose of Congress is to "promote nuclear
power" simply because Congress has not rewritten the Atomic
Energy Act.
·It has been suggested that a reviewing court must also consider whether Congress constitutionally may exercise its power
to force directly upon the states Congress' choice as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental
functions are to be made. In National League of Cities v.
Usery,201 the United States Supreme Court found invalid Congress' command (pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority) to
state governments to pay certain state employees minimum
wage. 202 In Usery, the Court inquired as to whether the minimum wage attempted to "devour the essentials of state sovereignty,"20S and whether the determination of the minimum wage
was "[a] function essential to separate and independent existence."204 If the Usery court concluded that minimum wage was
199. Pacific Gas at _ , 103 S.Ct. at 1729.
200. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
201. 426 U.S. 833 (1975).
202. [d. at 855. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) where the
Court observed: "Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do
not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred by
Congress by the Commerce Clause."
203. Usery at 845 (quoting Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 133, 205 (1968».
204. Usery at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580, (1911».
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a traditional aspect of state sovereignty, a reviewing court must
also conclude that the manner in which a state will regulate the
generation of electricity as a vital aspect to a state's separate
and independent existence. Thus, even if a court finds that Congress has impliedly required California to accept and continue to
operate nuclear reactors, proponents of nuclear power will have
shown that this federal mandate is justified by "an extremely
serious problem which endanger[s] the well-being of all the component parts of our federal system and which only collective action by the National Government might forestall."20Ii In light of
the decline of the nuclear industry, and the public and state governmental opposition to nuclear power, a reviewing court should
consider Congress's inaction as implied consent to a state's decision to reduce its dependence on nuclear power.

v.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's validation of section
25524.2 was premised on the state's traditional police power to
regulate the need for and generation of electrical power. The
preemption analysis employed in Pacific Gas may be viewed as a
straightforward application of the Rice preemption test to an industry regulated primarily by the federal government. However,
the unanimous decision in Pacific Gas suggests the Court's willingness to prohibit the powers of the States from regulating the
construction and operation of a nuclear plant if the attempted
regulation either conflicts with a federal determination as to the
safety of a plant or if the states' law could conceivably interfere
with the continued development of nuclear power. In light of the
controversy surrounding the nuclear industry, the dicta in Pacific Gas will likely be subject to litigation in the future years.
Derek G. Howard

AM.
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205. [d. at 351-853 citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542. See generally L. TamE,
CONST. LAWS 379-394 (1978).
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